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Owner of the Vogtle 1-4 nuclear complex in Georgia. Vogtle 3 and 4 (AP1000) achieved commercial operation in 2023 and 2024 respectively.
| Year / Stage | Total Project Cost Estimate | Schedule Status | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 BoE (Board of Estimate) | ~$14B (combined Units 3 + 4) | Target COD: Unit 3 = 2016; Unit 4 = 2017 | Initial estimate published with NRC COL applications | |
| 2010 (NRC COL approval) | ~$14B | Target COD: Unit 3 = 2016; Unit 4 = 2017 | No change at COL stage | |
| 2013 (early construction) | ~$15B (modest +$1B) | Target slip: Unit 3 = 2017; Unit 4 = 2018 | First public acknowledgment of schedule slip | |
| 2017 (Westinghouse bankruptcy) | ~$25B | Target slip: Unit 3 = 2020; Unit 4 = 2021 | Westinghouse files Ch. 11 March 2017; consortium absorbs construction management; cost estimate restated | |
| 2020 (mid-construction) | ~$28B+ | Target slip: Unit 3 = 2021; Unit 4 = 2022 | Continued cost growth; Georgia PSC orders accountability review | |
| 2021 (revised estimate) | ~$30B | Target slip: Unit 3 = 2022 (subsequently late 2023); Unit 4 = 2023 (subsequently 2024) | VCM 25 estimate; continued schedule pressure | |
| 2023 (Unit 3 COD July 31, 2023) | ~$31B (Unit 3 portion at COD) | Unit 3 actual COD = July 31, 2023 (7-year slip from 2016 target) | First AP1000 in commercial operation globally | |
| 2024 (Unit 4 COD April 29, 2024) | ~$34B (combined final) | Unit 4 actual COD = April 29, 2024 (7-year slip from 2017 target) | Both units in commercial operation | |
| Cost overrun summary | ~$20B overrun (~2.4x the 2008 BoE) | ~7-year average schedule slip | Average overnight cost ~$15K/kW (vs $5-7K/kW South Korean APR1400 builds; ~$3K/kW Chinese CNNC builds) | |
| Georgia Power's share of overrun (45.7%) | ~$9.1B+ over original allocated share | Schedule slip allocated proportionally | Georgia Power authorized rate-base recovery (~$7.6B); remainder absorbed by parent | |
| Editorial. Why this matters | Strategic context | Vogtle is the case study cited in every US new-build risk discussion. The 2.4x cost overrun + 7-year slip explains why no other US utility has committed to a new large reactor since (DOE LPO has incentivized SMR development instead). For SO specifically, the 2024 final COD removes the last major construction overhang; FCF generation should improve materially through 2025-2027 as the Vogtle PPA economics settle. Marquee question for the sector: does the US revisit large reactors, and what cost-sharing structure makes the second attempt viable? |
2021-Q1-2025-Q4
1993-2025

$SO
Owner of the Vogtle Units 1-4 nuclear complex in Georgia. Vogtle Units 3 and 4 (AP1000 design) achieved commercial operation in July 2023 and April 2024 respectively, the first new US large reactors since Watts Bar 2 in 2016. Final cost approximately $35B all-in.