Aerospace Certification
Certification Status Tracker
Aircraft can be built, flown, and parked, but none of it converts to cash until the type certificate lands. Boeing is still waiting on two variants (the 777-9 and 777-8 Freighter) after the 737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 cleared, which is why its near-term delivery guidance is more sensitive to the FAA than to its own factories.
Boeing 737 MAX 7
Certified- Where it stands:
- FAA amended type certificate issued Aug 3, 2026
- Target:
- First delivery 2027 (Boeing, Jul 28)
- Context:
- The first of the waiting Boeing variants to clear. The FAA issued the amended type certificate and an updated Production Limitation Record after requiring changes to the flight-control software, flightcrew alerting and engine anti-ice system. Southwest is the launch customer, and Boeing said it is preparing the first delivery. About 40 MAX 7 and MAX 10 aircraft were in inventory at Jun 30.
Boeing 737 MAX 10
Certified- Where it stands:
- FAA amended type certificate and updated Production Limitation Record issued Oct 20, 2026
- Target:
- Deliveries to begin in the coming months (Boeing, Oct 20); first delivery 2027 per Boeing's Jul 28 guidance
- Context:
- The largest 737 and the direct answer to the A321neo, which has been selling into the gap for the whole delay. The FAA required an enhanced angle-of-attack sensor and flight-control updates before approving it, and Boeing says it is the first airliner certified to the full extent of the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. Orders total 1,555 from more than 30 customers, more than 30 percent of unfilled 737 MAX orders (Boeing, Oct 20).
Boeing 777-9
Delayed- Where it stands:
- Certification flight testing under TIA phase 4B; ETOPS authorization pending
- Target:
- First delivery 2027
- Context:
- Originally due in service in 2020, which puts the programme roughly seven years late. The FAA has signalled it will certify the 777-9 after the two 737 variants. On Sep 16 Boeing said ETOPS authorization waits on the GE9X mid-seal certification plan, so some testing may spill into 2027, and that it still plans 2027 deliveries.
Boeing 777-8 Freighter
Behind the 777-9- Where it stands:
- Queued behind the passenger variant
- Target:
- First delivery about two years after the first 777-9
- Context:
- Cannot move ahead of the 777-9 in the certification queue, so its schedule inherits every slip above it. To bridge the gap the FAA granted exemption 26705 on Sep 15, 2026, letting Boeing obtain first airworthiness certificates for up to 35 more current 777Fs from Jan 1, 2028 through Jan 1, 2031.
Airbus A321XLR
Certified- Where it stands:
- Type certificate granted, in service
- Target:
- Delivering
- Context:
- The extra-long-range narrowbody. Certified and flying, with the rear centre tank protection requirement resolved during the campaign.
Airbus A350F
In flight test- Where it stands:
- First flight Sep 29, 2026 (MSN 700)
- Target:
- Flight test campaign of over 9 months, then EASA type certification
- Context:
- The freighter derivative of the A350, aimed squarely at the 777 Freighter as ICAO emissions rules close the older type out. Airbus counted 115 orders from 14 disclosed customers at the end of August 2026. The second test aircraft, MSN 701, is in final assembly.
The 737 MAX Production Ceiling
For two years the most consequential number in Boeing's cash flow was set by a regulator. The FAA capped output at 38 per month after the door-plug blowout, held it there for 21 months, then replaced the hard cap with performance-based oversight.
- Jan 2024FAA caps productionThe FAA freezes 737 output at 38 per month after the Alaska Airlines door-plug blowout and opens an audit of Boeing's quality system.
- Oct 2025First increase approvedAfter 21 months at the cap, the FAA clears the first step up to 42 per month.
- May 2026Capstone review clearedBoeing passes the FAA capstone review and moves to 47 per month.
- 2027Next step (stated, undated)Boeing's Q3 2026 10-Q says it is still working toward stabilizing 737 output at 47 per month and now expects to stabilize in 2027, then, after demonstrating stability for a period of time, plans to increase to 52. It attributes lower margins to the third-quarter decision to delay planned 737 and 787 rate increases. A new 737 line began low-rate production in July 2026 and must be production-certified by the FAA before first delivery. No date has been given for 52, and this is a stated plan rather than a cleared rate.
How Late Programmes Run
Delay is the normal condition of a clean-sheet aircraft programme, not a feature of this era: the 787 and A350 both ran years over a decade ago. What has changed is the concentration, with Boeing carrying two seven-year slips at once.
Eight Years of Regulatory Escalation
The FAA moved from delegating certification work to Boeing, to grounding its best-selling aircraft, to capping how many it could build, to auditing the system that builds them. Every timeline on this tab is downstream of that shift.
- Oct 2018Lion Air Flight 610
The first 737 MAX loss. MCAS, a flight-control system most pilots had not been told about, is identified in the investigation.
- Mar 2019Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and the global grounding
The second loss in five months. Regulators worldwide ground the 737 MAX, and the FAA is the last major authority to act.
- Nov 2020FAA rescinds the grounding order
Twenty months out of service. Return required design changes, new training, and a rebuilt certification basis.
- Jan 2024Alaska Airlines door-plug blowout and the production cap
The FAA caps 737 output at 38 per month and opens an audit of Boeing's production quality system. The cap holds for 21 months.
- Oct 2025FAA approves the first rate increase
Output cleared to 42 per month, the first relief since the cap was imposed.
- Dec 2025Boeing completes the re-acquisition of Spirit AeroSystems
The 737 fuselage supplier comes back in house, with Airbus taking over the Airbus work packages. Vertical integration as a quality fix.
- Mar 2026Hard cap replaced with performance-based oversight
The FAA ties future rate increases to Boeing's Product Quality Management System rather than a fixed number. Not confirmed in a primary source as of 2026-10-25.
- May 2026Boeing clears the FAA capstone review
737 output begins moving to 47 per month, which Boeing said in September it has not yet stabilised. Boeing has named 52 per month as the next step but gives no date: it first has to stabilise 47 and certify a second 737 line.
- Jul 2026737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 finish certification flight testing
Both variants enter the final stage of certification, with first deliveries targeted for 2027 and the 777-9 queued behind them.
- Jul 2026FAA restores Boeing's authority to issue airworthiness certificates
From Jul 20, Boeing again issues the final airworthiness certificate on every new 737 MAX and 787, after eight months in which it and the FAA issued them on alternating weeks with comparable quality findings. The FAA had withdrawn the authority for the 737 MAX in 2019 and for the 787 in 2022.
- Aug 2026FAA certifies the 737 MAX 7
The first of Boeing's waiting variants clears, after almost a decade of review. The amended type certificate required changes to the flight-control software, flightcrew alerting and engine anti-ice system.
- Sep 2026FAA exempts 35 more 777 Freighters from the CO2 standard
Boeing may obtain first airworthiness certificates for up to 35 more 777Fs from Jan 1, 2028 through Jan 1, 2031, bridging to the 777-8 Freighter.
- Oct 2026FAA certifies the 737 MAX 10
The amended type certificate and an updated Production Limitation Record complete the 737 MAX family. The FAA required an enhanced angle-of-attack sensor and flight-control updates under the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, and Boeing says deliveries begin in the coming months.
Who Certifies What
A US type certificate does not by itself allow European operations. EASA validates FAA certificates under the US-EU bilateral, and the reverse. CAAC certification of the C919 is independent and is not a western validation on this page.
| Authority | Issues |
|---|---|
FAA United States | Type certificates, production certificates, airworthiness certificates, airworthiness directives |
EASA European Union and associated states | EU type certificates, design organisation approvals, production organisation approvals |
TCCA Canada | Canadian type certificates and production certificates |
ANAC Brazil | Brazilian type certificates for Embraer programmes |
CAAC China | Chinese type certificates, including C919 |
NTSB Findings, Alaska Airlines 1282
Probable cause was Boeing's failure to train, guide, and oversee factory workers so that door-plug bolts removed for rivet rework were put back. The FAA's compliance-enforcement surveillance was a contributing cause. Adopted June 2025.
Event
5 January 2024, climb through about 14,830 feet after takeoff from Portland. Left mid-exit door plug departed. Rapid depressurization. One flight attendant and seven passengers minor injuries. Substantial airplane damage.
Probable cause
Boeing Commercial Airplanes failed to provide adequate training, guidance, and oversight so manufacturing personnel would follow the parts-removal process and reinstall the securing bolts and hardware.
Contributing cause
The FAA's ineffective compliance-enforcement surveillance and audit planning failed to identify and force Boeing to fix repetitive, systemic nonconformance in the parts-removal process.
Factory sequence
The door plug was opened at Renton on 18 September 2023 for rivet repair without the required removal record, and closed the next day. Specialized technicians required by Boeing's procedure were not on shift. No quality-assurance inspection of the closure followed.
Hardware
The four securing bolts were not reinstalled. The plug was held only by the remaining structure until it departed in flight, three months after delivery.
Safety management system
In the two years before the accident, Boeing's voluntary SMS was inadequate, lacked formal FAA oversight, and did not proactively identify and mitigate the risk.
Recommendations
11 new recommendations to the FAA and 8 to Boeing (A-25-015 through A-25-033), including completion of an MED-plug design enhancement and an airworthiness directive for in-service aircraft.
| Item | Finding |
|---|---|
| Event | 5 January 2024, climb through about 14,830 feet after takeoff from Portland. Left mid-exit door plug departed. Rapid depressurization. One flight attendant and seven passengers minor injuries. Substantial airplane damage. |
| Probable cause | Boeing Commercial Airplanes failed to provide adequate training, guidance, and oversight so manufacturing personnel would follow the parts-removal process and reinstall the securing bolts and hardware. |
| Contributing cause | The FAA's ineffective compliance-enforcement surveillance and audit planning failed to identify and force Boeing to fix repetitive, systemic nonconformance in the parts-removal process. |
| Factory sequence | The door plug was opened at Renton on 18 September 2023 for rivet repair without the required removal record, and closed the next day. Specialized technicians required by Boeing's procedure were not on shift. No quality-assurance inspection of the closure followed. |
| Hardware | The four securing bolts were not reinstalled. The plug was held only by the remaining structure until it departed in flight, three months after delivery. |
| Safety management system | In the two years before the accident, Boeing's voluntary SMS was inadequate, lacked formal FAA oversight, and did not proactively identify and mitigate the risk. |
| Recommendations | 11 new recommendations to the FAA and 8 to Boeing (A-25-015 through A-25-033), including completion of an MED-plug design enhancement and an airworthiness directive for in-service aircraft. |
DOT OIG on FAA Oversight of Boeing Production
The October 2024 inspector-general audit found FAA audits are not data-targeted, supplier First Article Inspections are not required reading, the compliance system cannot see repeats, and FAA had no measurable criteria to return ODA delegation.
Audits are not targeted with data
FAA exceeds its own minimum audit count but does not use data-driven assessments to aim those audits, and the audits are not structured as comprehensive assessments of the production line.
Supplier conformity is weakly checked
FAA has not adequately ensured Boeing and its suppliers produce parts that conform to the approved design. Inspectors are not required to review First Article Inspections.
The compliance system cannot see repeats
FAA's CEA system cannot track milestones or determine whether a noncompliance is repetitive and therefore needs elevated action.
Boeing's SMS has not been fully assessed
FAA has not fully assessed the effectiveness of Boeing's Safety Management System, including how it interfaces with the quality system.
No criteria to return ODA delegation
FAA has not established specific, measurable criteria Boeing must meet before delegated authority is returned to the Organization Designation Authorization unit.
Undue-pressure cases sat open
Of 34 allegations reviewed, 15 remained unresolved at FAA for more than a year, and two had been open more than two years.
| Finding | What the audit said |
|---|---|
| Audits are not targeted with data | FAA exceeds its own minimum audit count but does not use data-driven assessments to aim those audits, and the audits are not structured as comprehensive assessments of the production line. |
| Supplier conformity is weakly checked | FAA has not adequately ensured Boeing and its suppliers produce parts that conform to the approved design. Inspectors are not required to review First Article Inspections. |
| The compliance system cannot see repeats | FAA's CEA system cannot track milestones or determine whether a noncompliance is repetitive and therefore needs elevated action. |
| Boeing's SMS has not been fully assessed | FAA has not fully assessed the effectiveness of Boeing's Safety Management System, including how it interfaces with the quality system. |
| No criteria to return ODA delegation | FAA has not established specific, measurable criteria Boeing must meet before delegated authority is returned to the Organization Designation Authorization unit. |
| Undue-pressure cases sat open | Of 34 allegations reviewed, 15 remained unresolved at FAA for more than a year, and two had been open more than two years. |
IATA All-Accident Rate
2025 improved on 2024 (1.32 versus 1.42 accidents per million sectors) but sat slightly above the five-year average of 1.27. Fatality risk moved the other way: 0.17 against 0.06, on eight fatal accidents and 394 onboard fatalities.
2025 Accident Rate by Operator and Aircraft Class
IATA members (0.72) and IOSA-registered carriers (0.98) sat well below the all-operator rate of 1.32. Non-IOSA carriers were at 2.55. Jets (1.03) were safer than turboprops (4.08).