Aerospace Certification
Certification Status Tracker
| Programme | Where it stands | Target | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
Boeing 737 MAX 7 In certification | Certification flight testing complete | Certification expected 2026, first delivery 2027 | The FAA administrator has said the MAX 7 should clear first of the three waiting Boeing variants. Southwest is the launch customer and has been planning around it for years. |
Boeing 737 MAX 10 In certification | Certification flight testing complete | Certification expected by end 2026, first delivery 2027 | The largest 737 and the direct answer to the A321neo, which has been selling into the gap for the whole delay. |
Boeing 777-9 Delayed | Certification work extended | First delivery 2027 | Originally due in service in 2020, which puts the programme roughly seven years late. The FAA has signalled it will certify the 777-9 after the two 737 variants. |
Boeing 777-8 Freighter Behind the 777-9 | Queued behind the passenger variant | Late decade | Cannot move ahead of the 777-9 in the certification queue, so its schedule inherits every slip above it. |
Airbus A321XLR Certified | Type certificate granted, in service | Delivering | The extra-long-range narrowbody. Certified and flying, with the rear centre tank protection requirement resolved during the campaign. |
Airbus A350F In development | Order book building | Entry into service late decade | The freighter derivative of the A350, aimed squarely at the 777 Freighter as ICAO emissions rules close the older type out. |
The 737 MAX Production Ceiling
- Jan 2024FAA caps productionThe FAA freezes 737 output at 38 per month after the Alaska Airlines door-plug blowout and opens an audit of Boeing's quality system.
- Oct 2025First increase approvedAfter 21 months at the cap, the FAA clears the first step up to 42 per month.
- Mar 2026Hard cap replacedThe FAA moves from a fixed numerical ceiling to performance-based oversight tied to Boeing's Product Quality Management System.
- May 2026Capstone review clearedBoeing passes the FAA capstone review and moves to 47 per month.
- End 2026Company targetBoeing's stated goal for the end of 2026. This is a target rather than a cleared rate.
How Late Programmes Run
Eight Years of Regulatory Escalation
- Oct 2018Lion Air Flight 610
The first 737 MAX loss. MCAS, a flight-control system most pilots had not been told about, is identified in the investigation.
- Mar 2019Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and the global grounding
The second loss in five months. Regulators worldwide ground the 737 MAX, and the FAA is the last major authority to act.
- Nov 2020FAA rescinds the grounding order
Twenty months out of service. Return required design changes, new training, and a rebuilt certification basis.
- Jan 2024Alaska Airlines door-plug blowout and the production cap
The FAA caps 737 output at 38 per month and opens an audit of Boeing's production quality system. The cap holds for 21 months.
- Oct 2025FAA approves the first rate increase
Output cleared to 42 per month, the first relief since the cap was imposed.
- Dec 2025Boeing completes the re-acquisition of Spirit AeroSystems
The 737 fuselage supplier comes back in house, with Airbus taking over the Airbus work packages. Vertical integration as a quality fix.
- Mar 2026Hard cap replaced with performance-based oversight
The FAA ties future rate increases to Boeing's Product Quality Management System rather than a fixed number.
- May 2026Boeing clears the FAA capstone review
737 output moves to 47 per month, with 53 stated as the company target for the end of 2026.
- 2026737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 finish certification flight testing
Both variants enter the final stage of certification, with first deliveries targeted for 2027 and the 777-9 queued behind them.
Who Certifies What
| Authority | Issues |
|---|---|
FAA United States | Type certificates, production certificates, airworthiness certificates, airworthiness directives |
EASA European Union and associated states | EU type certificates, design organisation approvals, production organisation approvals |
TCCA Canada | Canadian type certificates and production certificates |
ANAC Brazil | Brazilian type certificates for Embraer programmes |
CAAC China | Chinese type certificates, including C919 |
NTSB Findings, Alaska Airlines 1282
| Item | Finding |
|---|---|
| Event | 5 January 2024, climb through about 14,830 feet after takeoff from Portland. Left mid-exit door plug departed. Rapid depressurization. One flight attendant and seven passengers minor injuries. Substantial airplane damage. |
| Probable cause | Boeing Commercial Airplanes failed to provide adequate training, guidance, and oversight so manufacturing personnel would follow the parts-removal process and reinstall the securing bolts and hardware. |
| Contributing cause | The FAA's ineffective compliance-enforcement surveillance and audit planning failed to identify and force Boeing to fix repetitive, systemic nonconformance in the parts-removal process. |
| Factory sequence | The door plug was opened at Renton on 18 September 2023 for rivet repair without the required removal record, and closed the next day. Specialized technicians required by Boeing's procedure were not on shift. No quality-assurance inspection of the closure followed. |
| Hardware | The four securing bolts were not reinstalled. The plug was held only by the remaining structure until it departed in flight, three months after delivery. |
| Safety management system | In the two years before the accident, Boeing's voluntary SMS was inadequate, lacked formal FAA oversight, and did not proactively identify and mitigate the risk. |
| Recommendations | 11 new recommendations to the FAA and 8 to Boeing (A-25-015 through A-25-033), including completion of an MED-plug design enhancement and an airworthiness directive for in-service aircraft. |
DOT OIG on FAA Oversight of Boeing Production
| Finding | What the audit said |
|---|---|
| Audits are not targeted with data | FAA exceeds its own minimum audit count but does not use data-driven assessments to aim those audits, and the audits are not structured as comprehensive assessments of the production line. |
| Supplier conformity is weakly checked | FAA has not adequately ensured Boeing and its suppliers produce parts that conform to the approved design. Inspectors are not required to review First Article Inspections. |
| The compliance system cannot see repeats | FAA's CEA system cannot track milestones or determine whether a noncompliance is repetitive and therefore needs elevated action. |
| Boeing's SMS has not been fully assessed | FAA has not fully assessed the effectiveness of Boeing's Safety Management System, including how it interfaces with the quality system. |
| No criteria to return ODA delegation | FAA has not established specific, measurable criteria Boeing must meet before delegated authority is returned to the Organization Designation Authorization unit. |
| Undue-pressure cases sat open | Of 34 allegations reviewed, 15 remained unresolved at FAA for more than a year, and two had been open more than two years. |
IATA All-Accident Rate
2025 Accident Rate by Operator and Aircraft Class
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