Aerospace Certification

Certification Status Tracker

Aircraft can be built, flown, and parked, but none of it converts to cash until the type certificate lands. Boeing is waiting on three variants at once, which is why its near-term delivery guidance is more sensitive to the FAA than to its own factories.
Certified
In certification
Delayed
ProgrammeWhere it standsTargetContext
Boeing 737 MAX 7
In certification
Certification flight testing completeCertification expected 2026, first delivery 2027The FAA administrator has said the MAX 7 should clear first of the three waiting Boeing variants. Southwest is the launch customer and has been planning around it for years.
Boeing 737 MAX 10
In certification
Certification flight testing completeCertification expected by end 2026, first delivery 2027The largest 737 and the direct answer to the A321neo, which has been selling into the gap for the whole delay.
Boeing 777-9
Delayed
Certification work extendedFirst delivery 2027Originally due in service in 2020, which puts the programme roughly seven years late. The FAA has signalled it will certify the 777-9 after the two 737 variants.
Boeing 777-8 Freighter
Behind the 777-9
Queued behind the passenger variantLate decadeCannot move ahead of the 777-9 in the certification queue, so its schedule inherits every slip above it.
Airbus A321XLR
Certified
Type certificate granted, in serviceDeliveringThe extra-long-range narrowbody. Certified and flying, with the rear centre tank protection requirement resolved during the campaign.
Airbus A350F
In development
Order book buildingEntry into service late decadeThe freighter derivative of the A350, aimed squarely at the 777 Freighter as ICAO emissions rules close the older type out.

The 737 MAX Production Ceiling

For two years the most consequential number in Boeing's cash flow was set by a regulator. The FAA capped output at 38 per month after the door-plug blowout, held it there for 21 months, then replaced the hard cap with performance-based oversight.
  1. Jan 2024FAA caps productionThe FAA freezes 737 output at 38 per month after the Alaska Airlines door-plug blowout and opens an audit of Boeing's quality system.
  2. Oct 2025First increase approvedAfter 21 months at the cap, the FAA clears the first step up to 42 per month.
  3. Mar 2026Hard cap replacedThe FAA moves from a fixed numerical ceiling to performance-based oversight tied to Boeing's Product Quality Management System.
  4. May 2026Capstone review clearedBoeing passes the FAA capstone review and moves to 47 per month.
  5. End 2026Company targetBoeing's stated goal for the end of 2026. This is a target rather than a cleared rate.

How Late Programmes Run

Delay is the normal condition of a clean-sheet aircraft programme, not a feature of this era: the 787 and A350 both ran years over a decade ago. What has changed is the concentration, with Boeing carrying two seven-year slips at once.
Still open, could move again
Settled, entered service

Eight Years of Regulatory Escalation

The FAA moved from delegating certification work to Boeing, to grounding its best-selling aircraft, to capping how many it could build, to auditing the system that builds them. Every timeline on this tab is downstream of that shift.
  1. Oct 2018
    Lion Air Flight 610

    The first 737 MAX loss. MCAS, a flight-control system most pilots had not been told about, is identified in the investigation.

  2. Mar 2019
    Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and the global grounding

    The second loss in five months. Regulators worldwide ground the 737 MAX, and the FAA is the last major authority to act.

  3. Nov 2020
    FAA rescinds the grounding order

    Twenty months out of service. Return required design changes, new training, and a rebuilt certification basis.

  4. Jan 2024
    Alaska Airlines door-plug blowout and the production cap

    The FAA caps 737 output at 38 per month and opens an audit of Boeing's production quality system. The cap holds for 21 months.

  5. Oct 2025
    FAA approves the first rate increase

    Output cleared to 42 per month, the first relief since the cap was imposed.

  6. Dec 2025
    Boeing completes the re-acquisition of Spirit AeroSystems

    The 737 fuselage supplier comes back in house, with Airbus taking over the Airbus work packages. Vertical integration as a quality fix.

  7. Mar 2026
    Hard cap replaced with performance-based oversight

    The FAA ties future rate increases to Boeing's Product Quality Management System rather than a fixed number.

  8. May 2026
    Boeing clears the FAA capstone review

    737 output moves to 47 per month, with 53 stated as the company target for the end of 2026.

  9. 2026
    737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 finish certification flight testing

    Both variants enter the final stage of certification, with first deliveries targeted for 2027 and the 777-9 queued behind them.

Who Certifies What

A US type certificate does not by itself allow European operations. EASA validates FAA certificates under the US-EU bilateral, and the reverse. CAAC certification of the C919 is independent and is not a western validation on this page.
AuthorityIssues
FAA
United States
Type certificates, production certificates, airworthiness certificates, airworthiness directives
EASA
European Union and associated states
EU type certificates, design organisation approvals, production organisation approvals
TCCA
Canada
Canadian type certificates and production certificates
ANAC
Brazil
Brazilian type certificates for Embraer programmes
CAAC
China
Chinese type certificates, including C919

NTSB Findings, Alaska Airlines 1282

Probable cause was Boeing's failure to train, guide, and oversee factory workers so that door-plug bolts removed for rivet rework were put back. The FAA's compliance-enforcement surveillance was a contributing cause. Adopted June 2025.
ItemFinding
Event5 January 2024, climb through about 14,830 feet after takeoff from Portland. Left mid-exit door plug departed. Rapid depressurization. One flight attendant and seven passengers minor injuries. Substantial airplane damage.
Probable causeBoeing Commercial Airplanes failed to provide adequate training, guidance, and oversight so manufacturing personnel would follow the parts-removal process and reinstall the securing bolts and hardware.
Contributing causeThe FAA's ineffective compliance-enforcement surveillance and audit planning failed to identify and force Boeing to fix repetitive, systemic nonconformance in the parts-removal process.
Factory sequenceThe door plug was opened at Renton on 18 September 2023 for rivet repair without the required removal record, and closed the next day. Specialized technicians required by Boeing's procedure were not on shift. No quality-assurance inspection of the closure followed.
HardwareThe four securing bolts were not reinstalled. The plug was held only by the remaining structure until it departed in flight, three months after delivery.
Safety management systemIn the two years before the accident, Boeing's voluntary SMS was inadequate, lacked formal FAA oversight, and did not proactively identify and mitigate the risk.
Recommendations11 new recommendations to the FAA and 8 to Boeing (A-25-015 through A-25-033), including completion of an MED-plug design enhancement and an airworthiness directive for in-service aircraft.

DOT OIG on FAA Oversight of Boeing Production

The October 2024 inspector-general audit found FAA audits are not data-targeted, supplier First Article Inspections are not required reading, the compliance system cannot see repeats, and FAA had no measurable criteria to return ODA delegation.
FindingWhat the audit said
Audits are not targeted with dataFAA exceeds its own minimum audit count but does not use data-driven assessments to aim those audits, and the audits are not structured as comprehensive assessments of the production line.
Supplier conformity is weakly checkedFAA has not adequately ensured Boeing and its suppliers produce parts that conform to the approved design. Inspectors are not required to review First Article Inspections.
The compliance system cannot see repeatsFAA's CEA system cannot track milestones or determine whether a noncompliance is repetitive and therefore needs elevated action.
Boeing's SMS has not been fully assessedFAA has not fully assessed the effectiveness of Boeing's Safety Management System, including how it interfaces with the quality system.
No criteria to return ODA delegationFAA has not established specific, measurable criteria Boeing must meet before delegated authority is returned to the Organization Designation Authorization unit.
Undue-pressure cases sat openOf 34 allegations reviewed, 15 remained unresolved at FAA for more than a year, and two had been open more than two years.

IATA All-Accident Rate

2025 improved on 2024 (1.32 versus 1.42 accidents per million sectors) but sat slightly above the five-year average of 1.27. Fatality risk moved the other way: 0.17 against 0.06, on eight fatal accidents and 394 onboard fatalities.

2025 Accident Rate by Operator and Aircraft Class

IATA members (0.72) and IOSA-registered carriers (0.98) sat well below the all-operator rate of 1.32. Non-IOSA carriers were at 2.55. Jets (1.03) were safer than turboprops (4.08).
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Aerospace Certification: Market Data | Sterling