Quantum

Quantum Computing Quantum Threat

The Quantum Threat in Five Ideas

The threat to cryptography is the most investable part of the theme because its demand is driven by regulation and timelines, not by whether quantum computers work yet. A future fault-tolerant machine would break the encryption that secures the internet.

Concept	What it means
Q-Day	The day a quantum computer can break RSA-2048 and elliptic-curve cryptography. Consensus estimates cluster around 2030, give or take a few years.
Harvest now, decrypt later	Adversaries capture encrypted data today to decrypt once a quantum computer exists, so long-lived secrets are already at risk regardless of when Q-Day actually arrives.
Shor's algorithm	The quantum algorithm that breaks RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. It needs a large fault-tolerant machine that does not yet exist at scale.
Post-quantum cryptography	New encryption based on math believed hard even for quantum computers. NIST finalized the first standards in 2024 and the migration can start now.
Mandated spend	OMB estimates roughly $7.1B for US federal civilian agencies alone (2025 to 2035); private-sector and global spend is a large multiple, and the deadlines are fixed.

NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards

The standardized algorithms that replace today's quantum-vulnerable encryption. NIST finalized the first three in August 2024, with two more on the way as backups based on different underlying math.

Standard	Algorithm	Basis	Purpose	Status
FIPS 203	ML-KEM (from Kyber)	Lattice	Key encapsulation, general encryption	Final (Aug 2024)
FIPS 204	ML-DSA (from Dilithium)	Lattice	Digital signatures	Final (Aug 2024)
FIPS 205	SLH-DSA (from SPHINCS+)	Hash	Backup signatures	Final (Aug 2024)
FIPS 206	FN-DSA (from FALCON)	Lattice	Compact signatures	Draft
FIPS 207	HQC	Code-based	Backup key encapsulation	Selected 2025, target 2027

Post-Quantum Migration Deadlines

The binding government deadlines forcing the migration to post-quantum cryptography. The clustering of hard dates between 2027 and 2035 is what makes this a near-certain, multi-year spend across government, defense, finance, and infrastructure.

USEUFranceUK

Post-Quantum Security Vendors

Companies selling into the migration, by layer. The pure-plays are tiny-revenue and narrative-sensitive; the large-caps treat post-quantum cryptography as one feature among many. This is the investable surface of the quantum threat.

Company	Ticker	Layer	What it sells
Arqit Quantum	ARQQ	Key agreement	Quantum-safe symmetric-key encryption software
SEALSQ	LAES	Secure-element silicon	Post-quantum secure chips (QS7001, ML-KEM and ML-DSA)
Quantum eMotion	QNC	QRNG	Quantum random-number generators and entropy services
Cloudflare	NET	Internet infrastructure	Hybrid ML-KEM in TLS at internet scale
Palo Alto Networks	PANW	Network security	Quantum-readiness products and cipher translation
IBM	IBM	Migration services	Quantum Safe discovery, inventory, and consulting
Thales	HO	Key management	HSMs, crypto-agility, and PQC migration services
ID Quantique / Quantinuum	IONQ / QNT	QKD and QRNG	Quantum key distribution and verified quantum randomness

Expert Survey: Likelihood of a CRQC

Global Risk Institute 2025 survey of 26 experts. Averaged likelihood of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is 28 to 49 percent within 10 years and 51 to 70 percent within 15 years, depending on how responses are read. Expert opinion, not a scheduled date.

What the $7.1B Federal PQC Figure Includes

OMB and ONCD's July 2024 rough order of magnitude for prioritized federal civilian systems, 2025 to 2035, in 2024 dollars. National-security systems and the private sector are outside this number. Agencies must update the estimate annually.

Scope	Amount	Window	Caveat
Prioritized federal civilian systems	$7.1B (2024 dollars)	2025 to 2035	Rough order of magnitude from first-round agency inventories. Not a precise budget. Replacement of crypto-immobile legacy systems is a large share.
National-security systems	Not in the $7.1B	Separate estimate under NSM-10	DoD, ODNI, and the National Manager for NSS are developing a separate funding estimate. Unpublished in this report.
State, local, and private sector	Not estimated here	Same cryptographic deadlines in practice	The federal civilian number is a floor for the migration, not the global spend. Private-sector cost is a large multiple and is not in this report.

Harvest Now, Decrypt Later

Why the migration is already a spend even though a cryptographically relevant quantum computer does not exist. Adversaries can record ciphertext today. NIST, CISA, and OMB treat long-lived secrets as already inside that window. Explanation, not a recommendation.

Idea	Detail
The recording is happening now	Encrypted traffic and stored ciphertext can be copied today. Decryption is deferred until a CRQC exists. The harvest does not wait for Q-Day.
Data lifetime vs Q-Day	If a secret must stay secret for 20 years and experts put a non-trivial CRQC probability inside 15 years, that secret is already inside the HNDL window.
What is most exposed	Long-lived classified records, health data, legal archives, industrial IP, and any public-key handshake that will still matter after a CRQC arrives.
Why mandates do not wait	NIST IR 8547 deprecates RSA/ECC in 2030 and disallows them in 2035. NSA CNSA 2.0 and OMB inventories run on the same logic: migration lead times are longer than remaining secrecy windows.
What this is not	HNDL is not proof that a CRQC is imminent. It is the reason regulators treat PQC as a cryptography-modernization program rather than a quantum-hardware bet.

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